7TH INFANTRY REGIMENT 31.3.1942.
2nd Battalion.
Combat report on the taking over and destroying of ”Ojanen’s bunker” on 31.3.42., 4:20 – 5:45
1. Task:
According to the verbally given order of the commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment the Battalion was on 31.3.42 to take over and destroy the so-called “Ojanen’s bunker” located on the north side of the Ohta road.
2. Plan:
I assigned the task of taking over the bunker to the battalion’s Jaeger
Platoon. For the task of exploding it a unit from the regiment’s Sapper
Platoon, strength 1 officer and 12 men, was subordinated to the battalion. In
the afternoon of 30.3.42 I, together with the leaders of the Jaeger Platoon and
the Sapper Platoon and the chief of the Mortar Company as well as the anti-tank
gun and mortar squad leaders, performed a careful investigation of the terrain,
at which time a detailed combat plan was put together. The action was to be
based on the element of surprise, due to which no preparatory fire strike was
going to be made. In the case that the bunker opens fire before the strike unit
has made it to the enemy trench one direct-fire cannon would be ready to open
fire into the bunker’s embrasures. The battalion’s mortar squad was ready to
give fire support to incapacitate the enemy positions immediately to the north
of “Ojanen’s bunker” in the terrain of the so-called Liisa base. To prepare for
the possibility that the enemy tries to come to the aid of the bunker by the
trench from the south fire support was agreed on with the chief of the Mortar
Company. Two anti-tank guns were given the task of destroying fire-positions
possibly revealing themselves during the battle and to support the repelling of
counterattacks.
Based on the investigation of terrain the auditory guard post of base 2 was selected as the starting point of the strike unit’s attack. The terrain in front of it rises so that advance under cover was possible for the distance of about 200 m. After this the terrain descends towards the enemy trenches.
3. Strike unit:
As mentioned above the strike unit was formed of the battalion’s Jaeger Platoon, led by Second Lieutenant
Voittis. For the task the platoon was divided into four squads, two having the
strength of 1 NCO and 5 men and two 1 NCO and 3 men. Staff Sergeant Ripatti
from the 5th Company took part in the strike unit as a volunteer. The unit was
armed with, among others, 12 submachine guns, plenty of hand-grenades and
satchel charges.
The sapper unit taking part in the action for the purpose of exploding the bunker consisted of 12 men led by Lieutenant Tujunen. They had with them roughly 250 kg of explosives which were transported with four sleighs. Both the strike unit and the sappers had skis and snow camouflage.
4. Carrying out the task:
On 31.3.42 at four o’clock, when the strike unit was moving to the starting
point of the attack with utmost care and silence, the weather was calm, frosty,
temperature about -10° C. The full moon was lighting the open terrain relatively well,
although the moon was already setting. Visibility in the open terrain was about
300 m. Audibility was good.
At the attack moment at 4:20 the strike unit started moving, the squads following each other with about 20 meter intervals. They skied silently, without poles, under cover provided by the blind angle. There was complete silence on the enemy side. In an anxious frame of mind, as they made it to the level of the ridge located at half the distance to the target, and after making a slight turn left after our own minefield, the unit begun a rapid descent towards the enemy trench leading to “Ojanen’s bunker” from the south. As the unit made it to about 30 meters away from the trench they noticed two enemy guards about 15 meters to the left from the point where they would enter the trench. In front of the trench there was only a weak barbed-wire entanglement, which was crossed on skis without trouble. Some tripwires were also noticed, but even though some got cut the traps did not function. The skis were left on the rim of the trench at the place that was agreed to be the meeting place after accomplishing the mission. The whole unit got to the trench unnoticed, as the enemy did not fire a single shot. The time was now 4:31. The two guards mentioned above lost their ability to function completely due to the sudden appearance of the unit. They were destroyed before they had time to recover from their state of astonishment. In accordance with the plan two squads turned south to secure and close the trench there. Part of these squads went to destroy the wooden dugout discovered to the north of the new road. It was not possible to establish whether there were enemies inside. Two squads started to clear the trench towards the bunker. This was done with hand-grenades and submachine guns. 15 enemy soldiers were encountered between the break-in point and the bunker and were destroyed to the last man, the squads moving forward speedily. A few enemy soldiers ran out of a dugout in their underwear, got behind the trench, and were destroyed there. Apparently the enemy was still not aware of what was going on, because no countermeasures were as of yet taken. The trench leading to the rear from the bunker was secured and closed by a squad of 1 + 5 while another squad pushed in to the backside of the bunker. The bunker was reached at 4:55. At first an attempt was made to open the door but it was shut tight. The door was made of armor and was of such strength that an ordinary satchel charge would not have done the job. Now the bunker too had woken up and was firing like blazes from both embrasures with machine guns. After a few shots by the direct-fire cannon the left sector became obstructed by a wall of soil and snow that formed in front of the embrasure, so that the bullets would stop in the wall or ricochet steeply upwards. The right machine gun fired vehemently along the Ohajoki dell. A few hand-grenades were dropped in the bunker’s chimney, but they couldn’t fall deep because there was a bend in the chimney.
The sappers, who by now were some 300 meters away from the bunker, couldn’t advance as quickly as planned, since a certain enemy rifleman got them under fire. As I followed the battle in base 3 I noticed that due to the abovementioned delay and good audibility I had an opportunity to give orders to the sappers by shouting, to get them to make haste.
At about 5 o’clock the enemy’s 6 inch gun fired the first grenades, which fell behind base 3. From somewhere further away the enemy fired a few more shots that exploded in the air (not shrapnel). At the same time our light mortar platoon and direct-fire cannon started to fire at the positions at “Liisa” and “Ojanen’s bunker” continued to fire furiously. The enemy threw two hand-grenades out by the door. Now the sappers had arrived and started to pile up the charge behind the door. The door was located at the end of an about 4-meter long corridor and one could expect that the charge would have a relatively large impact at least on the backside of the bunker. There was no other possibility for placing the charge, since the door could not be opened. At 5:15 the situation started to seem distressing, as an enemy counterstrike by about a platoon-size group had started through the trench from the south. The heavy mortars had already for some time fired onto this part of the trench, getting a few hits, which didn’t however stop the enemy advance. Their pressure continued and was already threatening and the small squad securing the trench fought bravely against the enemy at close distance. Simultaneously it was discovered that approximately 15 enemy soldiers were approaching from the east in the direction of the Ohta road, on the north side of it, and another group of about 10 men were noticed in the direction of the Ohajoki dell. The prior of these groups was advancing partly under cover of a smokescreen.
By 5:25 the sappers had managed to set the charge in place. The squad securing the trench near Ohajoki got engaged with the enemy group approaching by the river dell, but the enemy didn’t press on very strongly after suffering some losses. After the charge had been set this squad and the one by the bunker with the sappers started to withdraw to the meeting place, except those left to light the fuse igniter. At this point another smaller wooden dugout was blown up. The strike unit’s leader ordered the anti-tank gun found near the trench to be blown up with a satchel charge, but this job was left undone in the haste. The gun’s sights were removed and taken away. The squad fighting in the direction of the Ohta road could only by extreme effort hold back the enemy who were pushing on, especially after one man had fallen and another gotten wounded. The group of enemy soldiers approaching from the direction of the road had also gotten threateningly close and the squad had to start fighting with them as well. They did succeed in destroying 6 – 7 men.
As the main part gathered for withdrawal at a safe distance from the bunker the charge was detonated, at which point the backside of the bunker was seen to collapse and large pieces of concrete broke off from the front wall as well.
The return journey turned out to be the most difficult part of the patrol. The sun had risen and there was light, so the enemy could see the withdrawing strike unit and the sappers also from their positions further away. When the squad securing on the right started to withdraw the enemy troops attempting the counterstrike manned the trenches and opened angry fire with their rifles. The bunker further back on the south side of the Ohta road also opened fire with two machine guns and one machine gun opened fire from the proximity of Metsäbunkkeri. At the same time the enemy’s 6 inch guns fired approximately 10 grenades into the area of the meeting place, not causing losses however. Fire from the enemy’s infantry weapons, effective from a relatively close distance, caused losses; two dead and three wounded.
By 5:45 the whole strike squad and sappers had drawn back to their starting point bringing with them in sleighs two dead and one badly wounded. The other wounded could move by themselves.
After withdrawal had been completed the enemy artillery fired around 12 grenades to base 2 and 200 meters behind it without causing losses or damage.
5. Distinguished in battle:
The following men deserve special commending for their actions in fulfilling this task:
The leader of the strike unit, Second Lieutenant Voittis, whose actions were calmly decisive and brave and on whom the success of the mission for the most part depended.
Squad leader, Staff Sergeant Ripatti, who briskly and bravely led his squad to the bunker, rapidly clearing the trench manned by the enemy.
Squad leader, Sergeant Nieminen, who with his squad repelled a counterattack by a stronger enemy thus enabling the blowing up of the bunker and securing the withdrawal of the main part of the unit.
Corporal Piiparinen, Jaegers Lehtisalo and Salmijärvi, who by fighting bravely repelled a counterstrike and stopped additional enemy soldiers coming to the aid from the rear.
6. Our losses:
Fallen: Jaeger Tikka Wounded: Jaeger Räsänen (light)
Jaeger Niini Jaeger Konttinen (light)
Sapper Teittinen Jaeger Heinonen (bad)
Sapper Mutikainen (light)
Sapper Pynnönen (light)
7. Likely losses of the enemy:
In clearing the trenches: 17 enemies
Repelling the counterattack: 6 enemies
Runaways from the dugout: 3 enemies
In the group approaching from east: 4 enemies
By Ohajoki dell: 3 enemies
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Total 33 enemies.
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The enemies destroyed in the two wooden dugouts and inside “Ojanen’s bunker” are to be taken into consideration in addition to these.
Battalion commander
Captain A. AHOLA
Envoy officer
Lieutenant T. MÄKELÄ
View cover drawing from the report