Matti Koskimaa: ”Tyrjän
rykmentti. JR 7:n ja Er.P 12:n taistelut jatkosodassa”
Published by WSOY, Porvoo 1996
First edition
Excerpt from Matti Koskimaa’s “The Tyrjä Regiment. 7th Infantry Regiment and 12th Detached Battalion in the Continuation War”
352 pages
Translated from the Finnish language
Pages 98 – 114
THE TRENCH WAR DEFENSIVE FORMATION STABILIZES
[Page 98] Major-General Aarne Blick was transferred to Aunus to become the commander of the 6th Army Corps on February 1, 1942. He handed over his duties to the new 2nd Division commander Major-General Hannu Hannuksela, who had earlier been the commander of the 19th Division. A. Ehrnrooth, who had been promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel on December 10, 1941, returned to the post of the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Division after being seriously wounded. When he returned to the lines Lieutenant-Colonel Ehrnrooth was still a convalescent, but a true soldier did not give up. Already during his convalescence he took care of high-responsibility duties e.g. in the Staff of Lieutenant-General K.L. Oesch’s 4th Army Corps, and filled in for the commander of the 28th Infantry Regiment.
In the middle of February Major-General Hannuksela gave an order on the organization of the 2nd Division’s defenses. He divided the division’s sector into three sub-sectors. They were from the left the Riihiö, Ohta and Tonteri sectors. 28th Infantry Regiment continued to guard the Riihiö sector and 7th Infantry Regiment the Ohta sector. The new Tonteri sector was defended by 58th Infantry Regiment. At this point the 1st Battalion/49th Infantry Regiment was in the reserve of the 4th Army Corps in Siiranmäki and the 2nd Battalion/49th Infantry Regiment was in reserve in Riihiö.
Starting from January 1942 the 2nd Division had support from six artillery battalions and one battery. The artillery commander of the division, Lieutenant-Colonel Perttu Heimolainen formed three artillery groups and ordered two heavy artillery battalions to operate as the division’s joint artillery battalions to be used for long-range tasks and to strengthen the fire of the infantry regiments’ assigned artillery groups.
[Page 99] The Russians’ combat activity during the trench war consisted mainly of reconnaissance and attempts to capture prisoners. The sizes of reconnaissance patrols varied from a squad to a platoon. Prisoner capture was often attempted with a company of troops, even two, supported by artillery and mortars. Proper attacks had limited objectives. They were made to destroy an important base, fortified position or artillery fire-control position. These attacks were often made with the forces of a company or even battalion, supported by artillery and mortars.
The Russians were fairly active in the air in the beginning of 1942. The activity was mainly aimed against the front line. The enemy dropped a considerable amount of recon parachutists on Karelian Isthmus for the purpose of espionage. These parachutists were typically dressed in Finnish uniforms. In March 1942 the Finns arrested around 10 such parachutists on Karelian Isthmus.
In February 1942 the defenses on Karelian Isthmus were reorganized. The Staffs of the Army Corps were disbanded or transferred elsewhere. The Karelian Isthmus Group started operating with Lieutenant-General Harald Öhquist as the commander, Colonel Valo Nihtilä as the Chief of Staff, and Colonel Olavi Sippola as the artillery commander. The name Karelian Isthmus Group was officially taken into use on March 1, 1942. The 18th Division, 2nd Division, 10th Division and the 15th Division operated directly under it.
The defenses of the Karelian Isthmus Group begun to stabilize at the level where the Commander-in-Chief had stopped the offensive in the beginning of September 1941. Gradually this level became the main defensive line that was in parts even strongly fortified, as was for example the case in the 2nd Division sector. The sector division in the Karelian Isthmus Group’s area remained more or less the same throughout the trench war period, until the spring of 1944.
The Russian 23rd Army operated on Karelian Isthmus. It had three divisions and about a division’s worth of border guard and fortification troops. The Russians had altogether 16 – 20 battalions of artillery.
Fortification work was performed in the 2nd Division sector throughout the trench war period. During 1942 a barbed wire entanglement was built in front of the support line. Dugouts, pillboxes, artillery fire-control positions and emplacements for artillery and mortars were also built. In 1943 these were strengthened and attempts were made to increase the depth of the positions especially in the Ohta and Tonteri sectors. Fortification was in many places very difficult due to the water in the soil. The most difficult it was in the center sector of Ohta. [Page 100] During 1943 the 2nd Division built the so-called bunker line behind the front line to create depth. This line was built, in broad outline, along the level of the command posts of the front line companies. Tens of covered pillboxes were built. Some of them were equipped with artillery pieces or machine guns. A few pillboxes were installed with armored domes. Anti-tank obstacles were built especially during 1943 and 1944. Also roads and mine-fields were built. Building the roads and maintaining them in the winter was a difficult task.
COMBAT ACTIVITY IN 1942
In
addition to the reconnaissance patrolling done by both sides a
few more noteworthy skirmishes took place. By the Ohta Road opposite to
our own
base “Pola” was a very strong and dangerous enemy bunker. Several
attempts had
been made to destroy it, by different means, without success. This
Russian
bunker had been named after the commander of the 3rd Battalion/28th
Infantry
Regiment, Captain Aimo Ojanen. In autumn 1941, together with Lieutenant
Sulo
Viuhkonen, chief of the 3rd Battery/15th Field Artillery Regiment, they
had
decided to go and destroy the hated bunker – just the two of them on
their own.
[Page 101] The dare-devil attempt failed. Captain Ojanen fell and was
left in
between the lines, in no-man’s-land.
Ojanen's bunker.
In the small hours of March 31 choice soldiers of the Tyrjä Regiment took to destroy the Ojanen bunker. A commando led by Second Lieutenant Niilo Voittis was put together of the Jaeger Platoon of the 2nd Battalion/7th Infantry Regiment and 18 sappers led by Lieutenant Tujunen. Several heroes of the Tyrjä battle took part in the strike. To mention a few: Staff Sergeant Ripatti, Sergeant Nieminen, Sergeant Laakoli, Under-Sergeant Hämäläinen, Under-Sergeant Arvola, Corporal Piiparinen, Corporal Partinen, Corporal Konttinen, Corporal Kemppainen, and Jaegers Korpi, Lehtisalo, Salmijärvi, Haavisto and Koponen.
The commando Voittis skied quietly, without ski poles, along a carefully planned route to the no-man’s-land. The enemy’s abatises were covered with snow so the skiers went over them easily. The sappers came in the rear, pulling four sleighs carrying about 230 kilograms of TNT. The strike force had advanced silently and skillfully, and surprised the enemy completely. The guards were eliminated before they could sound the alarm. Around 15 enemy soldiers were stifled before they could raise their weapons. Sergeant Nieminen and Under-Sergeant Hämäläinen and the squads they led attacked to the right, towards the road, where they met with resistance. Corporal Piiparinen destroyed an enemy dugout with a piled-up charge. At the same time the enemy started attacking along the trench from the direction of the road with squad to platoon size groups. The squads of Nieminen and Hämäläinen effectively protected the flank and rear of the blow-up group while causing the enemy heavy casualties. In the other direction Sergeant Laakoli and his squad were also covering the blow-up group’s flank from enemy counterattacks. Second Lieutenant Voittis and Staff Sergeant Ripatti with their squads surrounded the bunker itself. The Russians were haphazardly firing from both embrasures of the bunker with machine guns. Staff Sergeant Ripatti climbed on top of the bunker and waved his hat as a signal of the road being clear to the back door of the bunker. Here they met with problems. The thick steel door stood all attempts to break it. Then Lieutenant Tujunen and his sappers arrived with their trotyl, which was piled up in front of the door to make a massive charge. Under-Sergeant Arvola and Corporal Partinen stayed behind to light up the charge. [Page 102] The Jaegers and sappers and their leaders withdrew to where they had left their skis, repelling Russian attacks. Staff Sergeant Ripatti destroyed one more dugout while detaching. The massive charge exploded. The rear part of the two meters thick roof of the bunker fractured. Blocks of concrete flew in the air. Flames flew out of the embrasures. The Ojanen bunker had been knocked out. As the commando detached the enemy pressed on harder and harder especially from the direction of the road. The morning was beginning to dawn so they were already in a hurry to pull back to their own side. The artillery supported the return of the commando Voittis with three artillery battalions. The front end of the commando made it to safety quickly. The rear end, instead, and the sappers with the sleighs got into trouble with the enemy firing at them both from behind and one side. The skillfully implemented destruction of the Ojanen bunker took the lives of two Jaegers and one sapper. Three Jaegers and two sappers got wounded.
Major-General
H. Hannuksela only had time to command the 2nd
Division for three months. He died on May 5, 1942. Major-General A.E.
Martola
was given command of the 2nd Division on May 17. He took over his new
duties at
divisional headquarters in Kekrola on May 19, 1942.
A view from the front at Ohta.
The battle for Sevastopoli
On July 20, 1942 perhaps the fiercest battle of the trench war on Karelian Isthmus was fought in the Ohta sector. The Finnish forward base called Sevastopoli was located in the Ohta sector, to the south-west of the southern tip of the Suur-Harvasuo swamp. It was defended by a platoon from the 9th Company/3rd Battalion/7th Infantry Regiment. The commander of the 3rd Battalion was Major Ilmari Koponen, the 9th Company was under Lieutenant Arvo Kuparinen, and the platoon leader in Sevastopoli was Second Lieutenant Lötjönen.
In the morning at 06:30 heavy artillery fire started against Sevastopoli and adjacent bases. After a few minutes the fire moved to the rear, all the way to the level of the 3rd Battalion command post. At the same time the enemy’s assault squad attacked the trench at the side of the outmost salient of Sevastopoli. Apparently this group had crawled to the barbed wire entanglement at night and cut a hole in it. The defenders were able to eliminate the first attackers in close combat but the squad managed to get a foothold in the trench. The machine gun and two anti-tank guns located at the tip of Sevastopoli were lost to the enemy right in the beginning. The defenders had to withdraw to the old barrier line that went across the base, but were able to stop the enemy attack there.
Our own artillery, 1st Artillery Battalion/15th Field Artillery Regiment, and mortars fired a continuous barrage in front of Sevastopoli and on the sides of the salient. Despite this the enemy fed troops through the rupture, unconcerned about the casualties. [Page 104] The area under enemy control, at the tip of Sevastopoli, was so small that at most a company of troops could fit in it. The next echelon of troops was waiting for their turn in front of the base, and must have suffered casualties from the artillery and mortar barrage.
Second Lieutenant Lötjönen and his platoon, which had already suffered losses of 15 men, fought a grueling close combat battle against the enemy, using handguns and hand grenades. The enemy kept on feeding troops through the dell of the creek leading to Sevastopoli from their positions at Korsukukkula. They evacuated their wounded using the same dell. The artillery fire-control position to the west of Sevastopoli, “Teräs”, had a view to Korsukukkula and the dell. The fire-control officer at Teräs, Second Lieutenant Mäkinen, and his commanding officer, Lieutenant Tuominen had been observing the events at Sevastopoli. On their own initiative they opened fire with their own artillery battalion’s guns on Korsukukkula and the dell. This brought significant support to the defenders of Sevastopoli.
The battalion commander started counter-measures. The platoon of Lieutenant E. Räisänen, from the 11th Company which was the battalion’s reserve, was sent to a counterattack. It attacked together with the remains of Second Lieutenant Lötjönen’s platoon at 09:20, after a preparatory strike by the artillery and mortars. The counterattack advanced only some tens of meters and then stopped. The platoons were pulled back to the starting point for regrouping.
The battalion commander ordered a new attack to start at 11:10. The battalion’s artillery fire-control commander, Lieutenant Punnonen, drafted a plan for a 10-minute preparatory strike, where the 1st Artillery Battalion/15th Field Artillery Regiment would fire at the tip of Sevastopoli and the 17th Heavy Artillery Battalion would fire an anti-artillery strike against the enemy batteries.
The preparatory strike started at 11:00. The artillery battalion fired 320 grenades in the preparatory strike and then moved the fire to barrage in front of the base. The mortars fired around 400 grenades and then also started to fire barrage. The 17th Heavy Artillery Battalion fired 240 grenades against enemy artillery positions.
The
infantry started their attack precisely at 11:10. They made it
to the trench held by the enemy and started cleaning it. The enemy
pulled back.
Now and then the enemy was under fire from their own direct-fire
artillery. The
Finns took nine prisoners, of which the Under-Sergeant Tuomas Gerdt
took five,
detaining them alone for half an hour, until he got help to move them
to the
rear. The preparatory strike by artillery and mortars had been very
accurate.
Tuomas Gerdt commented: “Very precise work”.
Tuomas Gerdt.
After the situation calmed down the battalion commander ordered Lieutenant Kaila’s platoon, which was in the reserve, to relieve the platoon in Sevastopoli. The exchange started at 18:20 and was still on-going when another artillery strike hit Sevastopoli.
Lieutenant Punnonen had been given permission to use the 3rd Artillery Battalion/10th Field Artillery Regiment and the 27th Heavy Artillery Battalion if needed, in addition to the two artillery battalions he already had in his use, so he could now command the firepower of four artillery battalions. When the action started again Lieutenant Punnonen immediately started to give fire commands. While doing that he noticed that the dugout was entered by Major-General A.E. Martola with Lieutenant-Colonel Ehrnrooth. [Page 105] After giving the commands he reported himself to Major-General Martola and explained the situation. When he heard that Punnonen had four artillery battalions to use Martola asked if any other artillery battalion could support Sevastopoli. When Punnonen announced that the 3rd Artillery Battalion/15th Field Artillery Regiment can reach Sevastopoli, Martola told him to use it. Punnonen now had five artillery battalions.
The quickly started artillery barrage numbed the attacking enemy. The defenders of Sevastopoli, who had retreated at first, turned back to make a rapid counterattack. They took hold of most of the base again. Only a small area in the tip of Sevastopoli was left to the enemy. At around 20:00 the enemy started a heavy preparatory artillery strike, for the third time that day. At the end of the artillery strike the enemy attacked with a squad that was stronger than the earlier ones and took Sevastopoli again.
The
battalion commander decided to start a counter-strike at 23:35.
He ordered the chief of the Machine Gun Company, Captain Toffer, to
lead the
attack, because Lieutenant Kuparinen had been wounded. Toffer’s strike
squad
consisted of the regiment’s Jaeger Platoon, lead by Second Lieutenant
Lauri
Taipale, and Second Lieutenant Tikkaniemi’s platoon-strong group from
the 11th
Company. Lieutenant Punnonen planned a preparatory strike where four
artillery
battalions and one battery and the mortars would fire at Sevastopoli.
The
strike started at 23:20 and lasted 15 minutes. The artillery fired
1,100 and
the mortars 600 shots. Right after the attack moment the fire was moved
to the
terrain between Sevastopoli and Korsukukkula and the enemy positions on
the
opposite ridge.
Caj Toffer.
The Taipale and Tikkaniemi squads attacked against fervent enemy fire. They reached the connecting trench on the Sevastopoli mount. Only the outmost apex was left untaken. Captain Toffer was killed. The battalion commander ordered Lieutenant Wigren to take command of the attack. He led the operation after midnight. The strike squad had suffered heavy casualties. Nevertheless it held the area it had taken with the remaining 20 men. Lieutenant Wigren ordered Lieutenant Räisänen’s platoon to assist. This platoon had taken part in the previous counterattack. The attack was continued with frenzied close combat fighting using submachine guns, hand grenades and piled-up charges. Lieutenant Räisänen fell in the early hours. Second Lieutenant Taipale was ordered to take command of Räisänen’s by now diminished platoon as well. The artillery and mortars kept on firing accurate barrage. This made it difficult for the enemy to send new troops to Sevastopoli. Some of the artillery fired at the enemy’s artillery positions. At last at 07:45 on July 21 Lieutenant Wigren could inform the commander of the 3rd Battalion/7th Infantry Regiment, Major Ilmari Koponen, that Sevastopoli had been recaptured completely.
[Page 106] The enemy was not satisfied with this solution. They regrouped for a new attack. The enemy grouping was broken up by a quick concentrated strike by artillery and mortars before they could start the attack. The battle had ended in a clear victory for the Finns.
The battle over Sevastopoli, fought in a tight, small area was one of the most intensive battles on Karelian Isthmus during the trench war period. Both sides used strong artillery. The enemy artillery fired around 15,000 shots during a period of 24 hours. Our own artillery used over 4,000 grenades. The Finns took 15 prisoners and caused the enemy casualties of altogether several hundred men in dead and wounded. Their own casualties were considerable, 12 died and 75 wounded.
VETERANS TALK ABOUT THE EARLY PHASE OF THE TRENCH WAR
Tauno Orilahti tells the following about the battle for Sevastopoli July 20 – 21, 1942:
The Jaeger Platoon of the 7th Infantry Regiment was called for a counterattack. Several men were on regular leave, so our combat strength was reduced to 24 boys. Our platoon leader at that point in time was Second Lieutenant Lauri Taipale. I was his deputy. The Jaegers were used to diverse action, based on the element of surprise. This saved our own men but caused devastating losses on the enemy. Control of the nerves, that’s what was needed. The plan seemed geared for success, when the commander of the local company, Lieutenant Wigren suggested that no artillery would be used this time. By contrast, the enemy concentrated their wall of fire on our side assuming they’d be safe behind it. The Jaeger Platoon crept, using the dimness of the summer night, to the terrain between Harvaoja and the Sevastopoli trench, in other words, right under their noses. The Russians sat in the trenches they had conquered and fired shots at the sky. As we started the advance Second Lieutenant Taipale got wounded in the hand. Shrapnel tore my jacket and cut the strap of my submachine gun. My gun fell on the ground, in water, but that didn’t matter. I had to lead the troops now.
The boys from Wigren’s company were supposed to join the end of our line right away. The Jaeger Platoon made it to the side of the enemy in the connecting trench, surprising them, and pushed the enemy away sideways. The Jaegers continued to the apex of Sevastopoli. We started a surprising charge that brought us the whole tip of Sevastopoli, and destructive consequences to the enemy. But the company did not follow us. We ended up in a bag. Our support did not work.
It is difficult to give up what you have gained. By reason the platoon should have detached at that time, but we were waiting for a miracle, the company to arrive, when everything would have straightened out and we would have won. We had only one man, Eero Hanhilahti, on the watch for our backs. Five men were running towards us in line from behind us. I hurried to where Hanhilahti was and tried to shout to him that the company is arriving. They are Russians, shouted Hanhilahti, and let his submachine gun sing. They fell like trees right there.
I was worried about the ridge and the position we didn’t have enough men to defend. Had the Russians understood to attack the ridge from the direction of the road, we would have been like on a plate. Once I joined four Russians behind them. That part of the trench quieted down for a while. At the position of the anti-tank gun I was hit in the back with shrapnel. That didn’t stop me.
Then I saw a miracle. I couldn’t believe my eyes. From the road walked towards us a heavy-built, curly-haired blonde, a big-breasted female medic. It was obvious she was trying to avoid stepping on the bodies in the trenches. After the battle we buried 220 enemy bodies. There were two female medics in this number. Many of the enemy soldiers might have been killed by their own hand-grenades we had to throw back to them.
[Page 107] From the anti-tank gun position I ran back to the platoon, where the Russians were attempting a counterattack. From the right a hand-grenade flew at me, and I couldn’t do anything to stop it. Eight shrapnel hit the back of my head, a life-long souvenir from Sevastopoli. I lost consciousness for a while. As I came to I saw how the boys destroyed an enemy light machine gun that could have shot me full of holes. I fell to the connecting trench, where my comrades tied me up. I was the 18th wounded. I soon tore the bandages away, because my white head would have made an easy target for the enemy in the dim summer night. Because I was bleeding heavily I decided to make an attempt to get back to our own lines to get help. We must get the wounded to safety! I shouted at Viljo Turkkila: “shall we try to stick to it?” He now had the lead.
At the dell of the creek Harvaoja, which was the way we had come here, the Russians had me in their sights. I had no strength to run anymore. At the bend of the creek four enemies were giving me a hard time. I could drive away three of them, but the fourth shot through my side when I was swimming across the creek. I somehow continued. I woke up at the rim of our trench. I asked the men from the local company to take me to the command bunker. I had no strength to move on my own anymore.
In the command bunker I was given upsetting information. They were planning a heavy artillery strike against Sevastopoli. No one seemed to know, even less believe, that the Jaegers had taken the apex and were still holding it. And protected their wounded, who were still there. I shouted angrily that there will be no artillery fire on Sevastopoli until we’ve gotten our own out of there. Rather send them help. The company commander, Lieutenant Wigren, threw me out of his bunker. I stopped the medics from taking me away. I would not go anywhere until I found someone who was thinking straight. I found such a man, Second Lieutenant Lauri Taipale, to whom I explained the situation and the anguish of the Jaegers.
Although I had good nerves, I fought with the Russians inside my head for ten days. Only at the military hospital in Helsinki I got them chased off. If I could have, for sure I would have gone back and with the others we would have broken to our own side.
The Jaegers don’t give up easily. Their leader now was Viljo Turkkila, the man who was to become successful in politics later in his life. Only when he only had three other men left who could fight, Heimo Puikkonen, Aaro Väre and Armas Koivisto, Turkkila decided to use the dimness of the night. He brought the platoon and their wounded back. This was an excellent achievement.
Only after the third attempt could we recover Sevastopoli and keep it. It was a miracle that again no one died from the Jaeger Platoon, only Paavo Ylätalo from Soini lost his leg.
The most significant part was played by Lieutenant Lauri Taipale, despite being wounded, and Viljo Turkkila. After Lieutenant Erkki Räisänen fell Turkkila led the battle for a while. Also worth mentioning are Jaegers: Eino Tammelin, Heimo Puikkonen and Aaro Väre. Also men from Wigren’s company took part in the battle.
Second Lieutenant Lauri Taipale served as the leader of the regiment’s Jaeger Platoon. He tells the following about the final phases of the battle for Sevastopoli at night between July 20 – 21, 1942:
Our regiment commander, Colonel Kemppi called me in the evening of July 20 and ordered my Jaeger Platoon to go quickly from Kaljalanjärvi to the command post of the 3rd Battalion and from there onwards to recapture Sevastopoli. At the command post I reported to Major-General Martola, who was there to follow the battle for Sevastopoli. As we left for Sevastopoli Martola wished us God’s blessing.
Captain Caj Toffer, who was leading the battle in Sevastopoli, came to show us the terrain. He advised us to go in line by the dell of the creek Harvaoja to the side of the salient and attack from there to the ridge. While Toffer was explaining the terrain to us our own artillery started preparatory fire. The enemy artillery was also firing heavily.
[Page 108] As our own preparatory fire stopped at 23:35 my Jaeger Platoon was not yet ready to go, because we had gotten to Sevastopoli at the last moment. In addition to us also Second Lieutenant Tikkaniemi’s half-a-platoon (about 20 men) was ordered to attack, and one more regular rifle platoon. After discussing with Second Lieutenant Tikkaniemi I went to the dugout to see Captain Toffer. I proposed to him that one more short period of preparatory artillery fire would be asked for, during which we could make it closer to the apex of Sevastopoli. Toffer said, that we don’t have grenades to use for repeated preparatory fire. We had a heated discussion. At last Toffer called Major-General Martola. We were given another two-minute round of artillery fire and were ready to attack.
Right in the beginning of the advance as we went through a hole in the obstacles I got shrapnel in my hand. I told my deputy Tauno Orilahti to continue as we agreed, I would follow after I got my wound bandaged. After I did that I noticed a group of men near me, and took them with me. We went until a few meters from the trench at the apex. Then I heard the shouts from my boys, being led by Orilahti. They were just about to enter the positions at the tip. I told the men with me to throw hand grenades into the trench, which we entered.
I could not see the enemy. The dimness prevented me from seeing if a clump on the ground was a stone or a body. I ran into Tikkaniemi’s group and thought our troops already had the whole apex of Sevastopoli. I wanted to go where my platoon was, but Tikkaniemi told me there were still enemy soldiers in between. This was because the rifle platoon had not cleared the area as they were supposed to.
Our initial charge did not lead into full success. The very outmost tip of Sevastopoli was left to the enemy. The Jaeger Platoon fought there trapped inside a bag. When Orilahti got wounded and they ran out of hand grenades the situation was very difficult. Many men from my platoon got wounded.
I heard Captain Toffer got wounded. He was replaced by Lieutenant Alf Wigren. Tikkaniemi also got wounded. I reported to the rear that it was no use to try to continue until we get more troops. I also reported that we would keep what we had gained so far. At night on July 21 fierce fighting took place in Sevastopoli with all types of weapons and hand grenades. Under-Sergeant Saarinen fell from shrapnel. Luckily he was the only one to die from the Jaeger Platoon, but we had many wounded.
As the morning dawned it was relatively calm. I started to look at the piles of enemy bodies. I noticed the cockade in the hat of one of the Russians. I took it, and the whole hat, at which point the body moved and started to claim his hat back. I explained to him that I would give back the hat but keep the cockade. I took it and put the hat back in the boys head. I told him to walk along the connecting trench towards our command post. He started walking, his clothes smeared with the blood of his comrades.
We got Lieutenant Räisänen with his boys to help us, and part of the sapper platoon. We took two dugouts held by the enemy. Lieutenant Räisänen fell around three o’clock and our attack lost momentum. Captain Toffer’s orderly, Under-Sergeant Tuomas Gerdt, who had come to aid us, also got wounded.
A fire-control group for the mortars approached us. I asked them to fire right into the positions at the tip of Sevastopoli rather than barrage in front of the base. We took cover in the fox holes because the mortars were firing really close. They hit the target right on the spot. It looked like the whole mount had lifted off. Under-Sergeant Turkkila and a few men rushed forward. They cleared the trench using submachine guns and hand grenades, and finally succeeded in taking the whole base. Only a few enemy soldiers got away, the rest fell.
Three of my men died and several got wounded. Turkkila too got wounded at the very end of the fight. About 15 men were left to occupy the base. We had been promised an exchange as soon as we’d taken the tip of Sevastopoli. The new men just didn’t seem to show up. The Russians attempted to attack several times but our artillery and mortars broke their troops apart in the no-man’s-land. [Page 109] Without support from the artillery and mortars we could not have held on to the base with so few men. We ran into more trouble when light rain and dirt started to hamper our weapons. Submachine guns no longer worked very well. We kept one cleaner submachine gun wrapped in canvas to be on the safe side. We’d only use it if the enemy got really close.
There was one functional machine gun in the apex of Sevastopoli, but all the men who had operated one had been wounded. I asked around but no experienced machine gun shooters were among us. I had seen how it was used so I took to the gun and ordered one boy to help me. I fired short series of shots whenever I saw movement. The first belt went well, but when I changed to a new belt I could only fire a few shots before the belt got stuck. I tried again, but the same thing happened. Luckily new machine gunners appeared. They said the belt was not filled correctly. They put in a new belt after which the machine gun worked properly. Then we felt relieved. The attackers could no longer threaten us. Thanks again also to our good artillery who supported us effectively.
Between the enemy attempts to attack I went around distributing ammunition to my men. I happened to notice movement in a crater made by a grenade in between the obstacle and our trench. I shouted asking anyone there to surrender. That didn’t have an effect so I threw a hand grenade. It bounced over the crater, but soon a man got up and approached me. I noticed he was making signs to someone and told him to tell the others to also come out. He said he was alone. I took my pistol and pointed it at him, and repeated my command. That worked and one more man got up and walked towards me. He also looked like he was planning something. I told them to ask the third man to get up as well. A third man started to come towards me but he was crawling on his knees. His ankle was crushed. I told them to go towards the rear using the connecting trench. The healthy ones started off immediately. I ordered them back and told them to take the wounded one with them. So they took him between themselves and started walking. We did not have men to spare to transport prisoners.
It wasn’t until the afternoon of July 21 that the exchange came and we could rest. I went to see the doctor who took away the shrapnel in my hand, cleaned the wound and put a new bandage on it.
Eino Valtonen fought as a submachine gunner in the 7th Company of the 7th Infantry Regiment. He talks about his arrival in the Tyrjä Regiment:
When we who were born in 1913 and those younger than us were transferred from the 49th Infantry Regiment to Colonel Kemppi’s 7th Infantry Regiment in October 1941, this regiment’s 2nd Battalion was resting in Siiranmäki. I ended up in the 7th Company. We were received by the company commander, Lieutenant Erkki Tikkanen, who was called by his soldiers “Father Tikkanen”. Tikkanen’s way of receiving us felt quite soft compared to what we had hear beforehand of the discipline in Tyrjä’s Regiment. In a few days Colonel Kemppi made an inspection. This was already pretty brisk. Our company was grouped in four lines. Tikkanen announced the company to Kemppi. After the report Kemppi asked the company commander, if he now had the required amount of NCOs. Tikkanen replied yes. Colonel Kemppi started walking along the formation. As he got to the third platoon he stopped and shouted: “Lieutenant Tikkanen! Why the hell are you lying to me! You just said you have enough NCOs, but here is a private in the place of an NCO.” Tikkanen said, “Sir, he is Under-Sergeant Juvonen.” Kemppi returned, “I don’t recognize an Under-Sergeant who does not have marks of rank.” Under-Sergeant Juvonen hurried to report to Colonel Kemppi. “Sir! I just received a new greatcoat and I have not had time to sew the marks of rank.” “That saved your company commander”, said Kemppi. The inspection continued, and Kemppi did not have anything else to remind about.
Veikko Moilanen fought in the 14th Company of the 7th Infantry Regiment as a squad leader. [Page 110] This is what he says about the trench war period:
In the Ohta sector of the 7th Infantry Regiment there was a base called Pola. It’s forward guard post was located opposite the hated and dangerous Ojanen bunker, just a bit over a hundred meters from it. The sturdy bunker’s dark embrasure looked frightening. Its machine gun wiped across the Ohta plain causing us casualties almost every day. Our base’s forward position was an old Soviet machine gun bunker. It was turned into a shelter by walling up the old door which was now facing the enemy and by opening a new entrance on the other side. The bunker’s entrance was so low that you had to crawl in. The door was just a piece of canvas. The stove chimney was tilted so that it could be pushed through the door opening. There was hardly any draught. You often had to have a cloth in front of your mouth to be able to breathe. There were plenty of lice in the bunker. When you spread your sweater on the snow it looked like every loop of the wool had a louse.
Our post had firepower. It included a 45 mm anti-tank gun, mortar, light machine gun, submachine guns, piled-up charges, hand grenades and Molotov cocktails. For observation we had a telescope fitted in an armored dome.
North of the base was the dell of Ohajoki River, which the enemy patrols used when they attempted to get into our positions, although the no-man’s-land had barbed wire entanglements and mines. Sometimes we were almost surprised by the enemy even though we were alert all the time.
We had lots of curious visitors, because the base had a good and interesting view into enemy lines. Colonel Kemppi and Lieutenant-Colonel Ehrnrooth came for an excursion. The visitors caused us trouble, because the enemy always fired immediately when they saw any movement.
Many attempts had been made to destroy the hated and dangerous Ojanen bunker. We who were nearest that bunker always had an opportunity. We pushed our anti-tank gun behind a bank, pre-loaded and ready to fire. When the enemy opened fire from the bunker, we fired our gun which was already aimed at the right place. We got many hits directly in the embrasure this way. However the Russians quickly repaired any damage, and the hated bunker continued action causing us agony and amazement. Once it was quiet for a couple weeks, when we apparently hit and destroyed the machine gun.
Our actions were dangerous, even though we were careful. Once Alfred Kärkkäinen was firing the gun. Just as he was picking up a new grenade, machine gun shots hit the shield of our gun, bullets coming through the hole for the sights. [Page 111] The optical sight went to pieces. Parts of it hit Kärkkäinen’s neck.
I tried aiming first, loading and closing the plate to cover the sights. When the enemy opened fire from the bunker I let off, being behind cover myself.
The winter of 1941-42 in Pola was one of the worst winters of my life. We had to melt water from the snow dirtied by grenades. The connecting trenches filled with snow when there was a scurry, so there was a lot of shoveling to do. It was difficult to get clean snow. This became the fate of private Herman Tourunen. He went to get snow to boil water for coffee. Our guard Väinö Tikkanen saw when Herman got wounded. Tikkanen shouted to us: “Tourunen got hurt”. We ran to him. He was lying on his stomach and groaning: “nothing doing, nothing doing”. Foam came out of his mouth when he tried to speak to us. We carried him to the bunker and bandaged him. The bullet had scratched the back of his head and entered through the shoulders. I used the field telephone to call for medics who came soon with their stretchers. “Hey, let’s go”, Tourunen said when they took him. The same evening our company commander, Captain Aaro Laamanen called and said that Herman Tourunen had died on the operating table of the field hospital.
The Ojanen bunker did not fall silent, not even after it was fired at with heavy weapons, and pieces of concrete and steel reinforcements flew. Only when Niilo Voittis’ squad went to blow up a few hundred kilograms of trotyl next to its door on March 31, 1942 did it quiet down for some time.
Eino Haapanen fought as a light machine gun man in the 5th Company in the beginning of the Continuation War. He got seriously wounded in Tyrjä on July 1, 1941. When he returned from convalescence he became the envoy for the 5th Company. After he went to the Reserve Officers’ School he fought as a platoon leader in the 7th Company. He speaks about the base number two in the north sector of Ohta and about Staff Sergeant Ripatti. This story shows how important individual elite fighters are.
Base number two was located north of the Cobblestone Road in the Ohta north sector. The Ojanen bunker was located to the right and front of us. There was always something going on at base number two.
In the early autumn of 1942 it was our platoon’s turn to spend three weeks in base number two. One dark night our guard Erkki Kokkonen noticed movement while walking by the 7-row obstacle. He fired a few rounds at the direction of the movement with his submachine gun. [Page 112] In the morning we found a dead enemy soldier under the obstacle, carrying a charge and a small dynamo. By spinning it one could have exploded the charge. One early morning private Kokkonen noticed another similar charge. This time it was placed under the barbed wire entanglement. I went to base number one to tell the base’s chief, Staff Sergeant Ripatti to be aware of the enemy who were planning something. I could hardly make it back to our own base when Ripatti was already approaching our base. He was discharging the explosives on the fly, pulling off the cables. Ripatti realized there was an enemy squad in the nearby ditch and fired his submachine gun at them, jumping quickly to our side. At the same time a charge went off 20 – 30 meters to the left of our base. Ripatti ran to the hole in the entanglement made by the explosion. He changed a new clip to his gun and was ready when a squad of enemy rushed towards the hole. His submachine gun started singing. We supported him with fire. Our whole base was alarmed, but in practice Ripatti alone prevented the enemy from getting to their objective. Unfortunately someone managed to shoot Ripatti in the leg. I noticed he had been keeping a knife in his boot just in case. I ran to the other dugout in our base to check the status there. Near the dugout I jumped into the connecting trench. At the same time a grenade exploded behind the next bend. The enemy had started to fire our base with artillery and mortars to support their own men’s withdrawal. Jumping to the connecting trench at the right moment saved my life. This was a close one.
Senior Lieutenant in reserve Arvo Koljonen fought as an envoy for a company commander at Kollaa in the Winter War. Without ever attending NCO school he was promoted to Sergeant during the peace-time between the Winter War and Continuation War. During the attack period he was an envoy-NCO. In the spring of 1942 he was promoted to Staff Sergeant. From then on he operated as a platoon leader and sometimes filled in for the company warrant officer. In the spring of 1944 he was on his way to officers’ school. As the Russian offensive started Lieutenant-Colonel Ehrnrooth decided that ready-made platoon leaders don’t have time now to go to officers’ school to “play war”. He made a proposal on some of his best NCOs being promoted directly to Second Lieutenant. So Koljonen too ended up a Second Lieutenant. He performed well as a platoon leader in the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment until the end of the Continuation War. I have (author of this book) written an unusually long introduction for Koljonen. I wanted to do this to point out that the best education - at least theoretical – will not necessarily produce capable leaders. Born leaders do well in the field of battle, those who can make quick and practical decisions that can be implemented, and above all, who can get their troops to follow. This kind of born leaders luckily existed in the columns of the 7th Infantry Regiment and 12th Detached Battalion.
Arvo Koljonen tells us:
The commander of the Karelian Isthmus Group, Lieutenant-General Harald Öhquist, came to visit the men at the front on Christmas Eve. [Page 113] I was the commander of the base. The General first went to the front line with me to take a look at the enemy lines, which were less than one hundred meters away. When we got to my dugout they couldn’t find the parcel of cigarettes that were meant for my men. The General said, “I won’t visit the whole dugout if all I have to give is my warm hand”. I summed up all my courage and said; “Sir, General, my boys will be very disappointed if you turn around behind their door without coming in”. The whole thing was sorted out by collecting a package from the cigarettes people in his entourage had in their pockets. As I escorted the visitors away a very young-looking man stayed behind to talk with me. I thought he was some Lieutenant from a high-level headquarters staff. When he noticed I was trying to see his marks of rank he introduced himself saying: “I am only a Lieutenant-Colonel, and I’m going to be the commander of this regiment”. I was so astounded that I didn’t even wish him welcome. This was my first meeting with General Ehrnrooth.
Eino Valtonen talks about a memorable meeting with Lieutenant-Colonel Adolf Ehrnrooth in the Ohta north sector.
During the trench war there was a strict rule about using a helmet while on guard. This rule was not always obeyed, especially during the summer. The helmet was hot to wear and combat activity was usually low. When in 1942 Lieutenant-Colonel Ehrnrooth became the stand-in commander of the regiment, they again started to enforce the rule more strictly. I was in a north sector guard post on a hot July day. I knew when my guard started that the commander was on the move. I thought that I would have time to quickly put the helmet on if the high-ups appear near me. But then suddenly Adolf showed up from behind the trench bend, followed by a bunch of smaller chiefs, and I didn’t get the helmet on in time. I reported myself properly as the guardsman should. Adolf immediately asked: “Why isn’t the guardsman wearing a helmet?” I said I’ve been having a headache all day, and it’s been really quiet here, so I thought it would be OK to have it off for a while. “Well, well, but what if suddenly a bullet comes, or shrapnel. That might give you a worse headache” said Ehrnrooth. Then he asked me all kinds of things, but did not reprimand me in any way, nor did he order me to put the helmet on.
Yrjö Jylli fought in the 9th Company/3rd Battalion/7th Infantry Regiment in the beginning and then in the Jaeger Platoon of the 3rd Battalion as a squad leader. He talks about a scrimmage in Mustilanmäki in April 1942.
A Russian elite group attacked a base called Kaita in Mustilanmäki (Riihiö sector) with poor results. Tens of Russians fell in the battle, left on the snow. The Russian attack happened to take place right under our machine gun position. At night we received orders to go to the no-man’s-land to evacuate the dead Russians’ weapons and map cases. We were also supposed to watch out in case the Russians made a new attempt, and if it happened, try to take a prisoner. That night the snow was frozen hard. Some new snow had fallen and our skiing was silent. We skied in two lines with our weapons ready and stopped once a while to listen, not to be surprised by the enemy. There were many dead enemy soldiers in the no-man’s-land, because the snow had been so hard they could not find cover. The terrain in the no-man’s-land was flat, but behind it was quite a hill, which gave us cover. Pauli Kilpilä and I skied in front, I went first and Pauli came right behind. I said to Pauli, let’s climb the hill to see if there are any fallen enemies there. [Page 114] As we got on top of the fairly steep hill, Pauli suddenly skied to my side and without saying anything pushed me back down the hill we had just climbed. I slid down the slope. Pauli followed. Right then “my Russian brother” fired a long round with a machine gun from a bunker that was less than one hundred meters away from the hill we had just been on. Tracer bullets flew like small cinders and small trees fell and tree branches broke off on the hilltop. Pauli’s push had saved my life. I thanked him for it. When we talked about it later Pauli said he just all of a sudden felt that we should go down now and quickly.